The problems that accountability can't fix

Accountability is a popular lever in large organizations, but it only works when the problem can be owned by a single person. The article argues that many failures, like the OceanGate implosion, fall into two classes where accountability is the wrong tool: coordination problems and mis-calibrated risk models.

In coordination challenges, top-down accountability tries to pin a stuck task on an individual, yet the real issue lies in how multiple components interact. The author notes that technical project managers exist precisely to own cross-team reliability work, but assigning accountability without recognizing the systemic nature of the problem creates a false sense of resolution.

Bottom-up accountability, exemplified by holding CEOs or politicians responsible, also falls short when leaders operate with flawed mental risk models. The OceanGate case shows a CEO-pilot who was maximally accountable yet mis-estimated risk, leading to disaster. The conflict between business incentives and safety creates a double-bind that simple accountability cannot untangle.

The piece recommends cross-checking and independent safety functions as alternatives, drawing on resilience engineering research. By spreading responsibility across diverse perspectives rather than a single accountable individual, organizations can detect coordination flaws and correct skewed risk assessments before they cause catastrophic outcomes.